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Reconceptualizing Vagrancy and
Reconstructing the Vagrant: A Socio-
Legal Analysis of Criminal Law Reform
in Canada, 1953-1972
PRASHAN RANASINGHE*
This article explores significant reforms to the vagrancy section of the Criminal Code
during the mid-to-tate twentieth century. By locating the reforms within their unique so-
cial, political, and economic climates, I examine how they reconceptualized the offence
of vagrancy and concomitantly reconstructed the vagrant as a social problem. The re-
forms. played a seminal role in reducing the number of vagrancy offences, eventually
leading to the demise of vagrancy in the criminal law. Yet, while the "vagrant" ceased to
exist in the law, the law still continues to preserve vestiges of the vagrant in a highly
gendered manner.
Cet article analyse les r6formes consid6rables apport6es a La section concernant le
vagabondage figurant dans le Code criminet, telles qu'etLes ont eu lieu au cours du mi-
lieu et de [a fin du vingtieme sibcle. En situant ces r6formes dans leurs climat social,
potitique, et 6conomique particutiers, j'examine ainsi La facon dont elles ont reconceptu-
atis6 l'infraction de vagabondage et en mime temps reconstitu6 le vagabond comme un
probltme social. Les r6formes ont rempli un rte important sur le plan de [a reduction
du nombre d'infractions de vagabondage, ce qui a finalement entrain6 [a disparition du
vagabondage dans le droit p6nal. Pourtant, tandis que le "vagabond" a cesse d'exister
dans le droit, celui-ci continue a preserver des vestiges du vagabond, d'une maniere for-
tement centr6e sur le sexe.
* Assistant Professor, Department of Criminology, University of Ottawa. I am deeply
indebted to the three anonymous reviewers and Professor Benjamin J. Richardson, the
Editor-in-Chief of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal, who provided very helpful and
constructive comments and suggestions as to how I might improve the article. I am also
grateful to Melanie Knight, Matthew Light, Jim Phillips, and Mariana Valverde who
read an earlier version of this article and provided invaluable feedback. Any errors
remain my own.
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THE IMPORTANT AND EXTENSIVE ROLE that vagrancy law played historically in
regulating a variety of people and behaviours in the Western world has been well
documented. Most studies, however, focus heavily on the United Kingdom (in par-
ticular, England)' and the United States.2
I. For the most comprehensive examination in cross-national perspective, see C. J. Ribton-
Turner, A History of Vagrants and Vagrancy and Beggars and Begging (London: Chapman and
Hall, 1887). See also Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, A History ofthe Criminal Law ofEngland
(London: MacMillan, 1883) vol. 3 at 266-75. For socio-historical studies, see generally A.L.
Beier, Masterless Men: The Vagrancy Problem in England 1560-1640 (New York: Methuen
and Co., 1985); Frank Aydelotte, Elizabethan Rogues and Vagabonds (New York: Barnes &
Noble, 1967); John Pound, Poverty and Vagrancy in Tudor England (London: Longman
Group, 1971); Paul A. Slack, "Vagrants and Vagrancy in England, 1598-1664" (1974) 27
Econ. Hist. Rev. 360; Laura Sagolla Croley, "A Working Distinction: Vagrants, Beggars and
the Laboring Poor in Mid-Victorian England" (1995) 18 Prose Stud. 74; Rachel Vorspan,
"Vagrancy and the New Poor Law in late-Victorian and Edwardian England" (1977) 92 Eng.
Hist. Rev. 59; and Nicholas Rogers, "Policing the Poor in Eighteenth-Century London: The
Vagrancy Laws and their Administration" (1991) 24 Histoire Sociale - Social History 127.
2. See Forrest W. Lacy, "Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition" (1953) 66 Harv.
L. Rev. 1203; Caleb Foote, "Vagrancy-Type Law and its Administration" (1956) 104 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 603; Rollin M. Perkins, "The Vagrancy Concept" (1958) 9 Hastings L.J. 237; and
William 0' Douglas, "Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion" (1960) 70 Yale L.J. 1. For socio-
historical studies, see Jeffrey S. Adler, "A Historical Analysis of the Law of Vagrancy" (1989)
27 Criminol. 209; "Vagging the Demons and Scoundrels: Vagrancy and the Growth of St.
RANASINGHE, RECONCEPTUALIZING VAGRANCY 57
Very little has been written about its effect in Canada, and these writings
focus exclusively on the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The criminal
law, however, underwent profound changes in both form and substance during
the mid-to-late twentieth century. One aspect of these changes addressed the
vagrancy provisions in the Criminal Code (the Code) that were reformed on two
separate occasions: first, during the 1953-1954 legislative session, and second,
during the 1972 session. What resulted was a significant reduction in the num-
ber of vagrancy offences. The demise of vagrancy law has not been subjected to
a detailed examination and this article attempts to fill that void.' In doing so, I
explore the way these reforms reconceptualized vagrancy and reconstructed the
vagrant as a social problem.
In speaking of the reconceptualization of vagrancy, I refer to the ways that
vagrancy as a legal category underwent profound changes. One example can be
found in the changes made to the constitution of the offence and the evidentiary
Louis, 1830-1861" (1986) 13 J. Urb. Hist. 3; and Sidney L. Harring, "Class Conflict and
the Suppression of Tramps in Buffalo, 1892-1894" (1976) 11 Law & Soc'y. Rev. 873.
3. See David Bright, "Loafers are not going to Subsist upon Public Credulence: Vagrancy and
the Law in Calgary, 1900-1914" (1995) 36 Labour/Le Travail 37; Jim Phillips, "Poverty,
Unemployment, and the Administration of Criminal Law: Vagrancy Laws in Halifax, 1864-
1890" in Philip Girard & Jim Phillips, eds., Essays in the History of Canadian Law: Nova
Scotia (Toronto: The Osgoode Society, 1990) vol. 3 at 128; and James M. Pitsula, "The
Treatment of Tramps in Late Nineteenth-Century Toronto" (1980) 15 Hist.
Papers/Communications Historiques 116. There is, however, a considerable amount of
literature on prostitution. See Constance Backhouse, "Nineteenth-Century Canadian
Prostitution Law: Reflections of a Discriminatory Society" (1985) 18 Histoire Sociale -
Social History 387; John P.S. McLaren, "Chasing the Social Evil: Moral Fervour and the
Evolution of Canada's Prostitution Laws, 1867-1917" (1986) 1 C.J.L.S. 125 [McLaren,
"Chasing the Social Evil"]; John P.S. McLaren, "The Canadian Magistracy and the Anti-
White Slavery Campaign 1900-1920" in W. Wesley Pue & Barry Wright, eds., Canadian
Perspectives on Law and Society: Issues in Legal History (Ottawa: Carleton University Press,
1988) 329 [McLaren, "Anti-White Slavery Campaign"]; and E. Nick Larsen, "Canadian
Prostitution Control Between 1914 and 1970: An Exercise in Chauvinist Reasoning" (1992)
7 C.J.L.S. 137.
4. For an exception, see Todd Gordon, "The Return of Vagrancy Law and the Politics of
Poverty in Canada" (2004) 54 Can. Rev. Soc. Pol'y 34 at 37-40; Cops, Crime and Capitalism:
The Law-and-Order Agenda in Canada (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 2006) at 81-82. His
treatment of the subject, however, is too cursory to do full justice to the complexities
associated with these reforms.
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requirements necessary for conviction.s In describing the vagrant as a social
problem, I refer to the myriad ways that he or she was conceived as problematic by
contemporaries, be it because of indigence, indolence, inebriety, or criminality.'
Thus, in exploring the reconceptualization of vagrancy in law, I pay attention to the
concomitant discursive reconstruction of the vagrant as a social and cultural figure.
In this article, I use the terms "vagrancy" and "vagrant(s)." However, it bears
mentioning that there are (dis)similarities and (dis)connections in the meanings of
these terms as they existed in law, when compared both linguistically and sociologi-
cally. Vagrancy was not an offence under law in the general sense of that term, as it
is understood in both respects. An accused was not charged with or convicted of
vagrancy, but of an enumerated offence within the vagrancy section of the Code. It
was only at the point when guilt was established that the label attached itself to the
person; that is, only then did one become a "vagrant." At the same time, it was nec-
essary to rely on the linguistic meanings of particular words as they related to the
vagrancy section of the Cod-for example, "public," "wandering," "apparent
means of support," or "common prostitute"-for the judiciary to make sense of the
lawmakers' intentions and resolve the legal ambiguities. In other words, there is flu-
idity in the meanings of these terms given that they crisscross the legal, linguistic,
and sociological fields. Thus, while in the rest of this article I use the terms "va-
grancy" and "vagrant(s)" without quotations marks, their (dis)similarities and
(dis)connections within these fields are important to keep in mind, for their mean-
ings vary depending upon the lens through which they are viewed.
This article unfolds in six parts. Part I locates vagrancy legislation in a his-
torical context. Parts II and III are devoted to the first wave of reforms to the
vagrancy section of the Code during the 1953-1954 legislative session. To that
end, Part II explores the impetuses behind these reforms, and Part III explores
the manner in which these reforms were carried out. Parts IV and V are de-
voted to the second wave of reforms to the vagrancy section of the Code during
the 1972 session. Part IV explores the impetuses behind these reforms and Part
V focuses on the manner in which these reforms were meted out. Part VI reca-
pitulates the discussion advanced, focusing on the significance of the two waves
of reform, including the state of the law and the social and cultural figure of the
vagrant as it currently stands.
5. See Part II, below.
6. See Part 1, below.
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1. VAGRANCY LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
There is a wealth of literature on the history of English vagrancy and vagrancy
law.' For present purposes, it will suffice to highlight several important aspects as
they relate to the Canadian context, to locate the (dis)continuities between the
past and the time under consideration here.
First, Canadian vagrancy legislation was closely modeled upon its English
predecessors. According to Constance Backhouse, the first piece of vagrancy
legislation can be traced to legislation that was passed in Halifax, Nova Scotia
in 1759. She suggests that An Act to amend and make more effectual the laws re-
lating to rogues, vagabonds, and other idle and disorderly persons, and houses ofcor-
rection' served as a model for An Act for regulating and maintaining a House of
correction or Work-House within the Town of Halifax.! Secondly, a defining fea-
ture of English vagrancy law was its eclecticism, or what A.L. Beier calls its
"protean"10 character. Under the category of vagrancy, a variety of concerns
ranging from labour, crime, popular morality, entertainment and leisure, relig-
ion, and public health were addressed. One example can be found in An Act for
the Punishment of idle and disorderly Persons, and Rogues and Vagabonds that
contains three classes of vagrancy-an idle or disorderly person; a rogue and
vagabond; and an incorrigible rogue-each enumerating specific offences." The
eclecticism of English vagrancy law was directly transplanted into the first va-
grancy law in Canada" and continued to be a defining characteristic of subse-
quent legislation.13
It also bears mentioning that English vagrancy legislation was characterized
by its mixture of punishment and welfare. Licences or certificates to wander public
spaces in search of alms were granted to particular persons thought to be in need of
relief: the impotent poor, the lame and disabled, the sick, disbanded soldiers, and
7. See supra note 1.
8. Vagrancy Act, 1744 (U.K.), 17 Geo. II, c. 5.
9. Backhouse, supra note 3 at 389. See also Philips, supra note 3 at 129.
10. Beier, supra note I at 4.
11. (U.K.), 1824, 5 Geo. IV, c. 83, ss. 3-5. This Act repealed all prior vagrancy statutes [Rogues
and Vagabonds].
12. Backhouse, supra note 3 at 388-99.
13. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
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university scholars, for example." This was true of Canadian vagrancy legislation
as well. For example, those who were deemed to be "deserving objects of char-
ity"" were granted permission to move about in public spaces in search of alms.
There was, however, a deep-seated suspicion that unwarranted largesse would
only breed further idleness and crime. Therefore, poor relief was to be provided
alongside the threat of punishment to ensure that only those deemed "deserv-
ing" were relieved."
The eclecticism of vagrancy law sheds insights into the myriad ways that
contemporaries viewed the vagrant as a social problem. First, vagrants were
characterized as "indolent, lazy [and] worthless fellows,"" who would rather
spend their days in idleness than work to earn a living. The terms "rogues in
14. This is true of all English vagrancy statutes that were passed until 1824, when this practice
was terminated. In summarizing this shift, Scott L.J. notes that:
The Vagrancy Act of 1824 differs little from the long string of earlier Acts in the Legislature's
attitude to the class of idle and disorderly persons except that it is simply a punishment Act,
and not, as the earlier Acts were, partly a punishment Act and partly an Act for the relief of
the poor.
See Ledwith v. Roberts (1937), 3 All E.R. 232 at 275 (C.A.). The reference to the 1824 Act is
to Rogues and Vagabonds, supra note 11.
15. An Act respecting Vagrants, 1869, c. 28, s. I [An Act respecting Vagrants]. For the importance
of charity and its relation to punishment, see Richard B. Splane, Social Welfare in Ontario,
1791-1893:A Study ofPublic Welfare Administration (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1965); Rainer Baehre, "Paupers and Poor Relief in Upper Canada" (1981) 16 Historical
Papers 57; Brereton Greenhous, "Paupers and Poorhouses: The Development of Poor Relief
in Early New Brunswick" (1968) 1 Histoire Sociale - Social History 103; Stephen A.
Speisman, "Munificent Parsons and Municipal Parsimony: Voluntary vs Public Poor Relief
in Nineteenth Century Toronto" (1973) 65 Ont. Hist. 33 at 37-41; and David R. Murray,
"The Cold Hand of Charity: The Court of Quarter Session and Poor Relief in the Niagara
District, 1828-1841" in Pue & Wright, supra note 3 at 179.
16. See Baehre, ibid. at 67-70. According to Baehre, by the 1820s, there was a distinction drawn
between the "deserving" and "undeserving" poor in social and policy circles, and by the
1830s, the moral character of the intended recipient was closely scrutinized. For a discussion
of the pauper list, see Murray, ibid. at 181. See also Greenhous, ibid. This distinction closely
parallels that drawn in England. between the "sturdy" and the "impotent" beggar.
17. Legislative Assembly, "Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Enquire into the Prison
and Reformatory System of the Province of Ontario" in Ontario Sessional Papers 1891, vol.
23 (Toronto: Warwick & Sons, 1891) at 721. The quotation is by William Stark, Inspector
of Detectives of the Toronto Police Force, who gave testimony before the Commission; the
entire Report contains numerous other examples such as this.
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idleness" and "worthless drunkards" were frequently used in reference to them."
Second, many, if not all vagrants were.regarded as habitual criminals who re-
sorted to crime. The term "professional criminal"" was often used to label pros-
titutes and tramps who were thought not to be in genuine need, but simply
waiting for the right opportunities to engage in more serious, and profitable,
crime. As well, indolence and inebriety-often regarded as the chief characteris-
tics of the poor-were seen as the "parents of crime."20 Third, many vagrants
were viewed as "morally depraved" or "outcasts."2 1 The nineteenth-century Ca-
nadian viewed the criminal as intemperate, illiterate, and prone to self-
destruction, belonging to a "self-perpetuating class" of citizens without fixed
abode.22 This attitude was especially so with respect to prostitutes.23 Even where
vagrants were not seen as a direct threat to the social and moral order, they were
still viewed by the general public as an indirect threat.' Either directly or indi-
rectly then, vagrants were perceived as being heavily problematic to the well-
being of the nation.
Finally, and though only peripherally relevant here, it bears mentioning that
Canadian vagrancy legislation operated both as criminal legislation, enacted by
the federal government, and as quasi-criminal law, enacted by the provinces or
municipalities. Prior to Confederation in 1867, vagrancy was addressed by mu-
nicipalities and provinces." After Confederation, the federal government sought
18. J. Jerald Bellomo, "Upper Canadian Attitudes towards Crime and Punishment (1832-1851)"
(1972) 64 Ont. Hist. 11 at 12-13. English vagrancy legislation equated vagrants with rogues
in two classes of its legislation: "rogue and vagabond" and "incorrigible rogue"; see Rogues
and Vagabonds, supra note 11 and accompanying text. An Act respecting Vagrants did not
contain these categories; rather, it used the one phrase "loose, idle or disorderly person or
vagrant." See supra note 15, s. 2.
19. T. Thorner & N. Watson, "Patterns of Prairie Crime: Calgary, 1875-1939" in Louis A.
Knafla, ed., Crime and Criminaljustice in Europe and Canada, rev. ed. (Waterloo: Wilfrid
Laurier University Press, 1985) 219 at 226.
20. Bellomo, supra note 18 at 14.
21. Ibid. at 12-13.
22. Harvey J. Graff, "Crime and Punishment in the Nineteenth Century: A New Look at the
Criminal" (1977) 7 J. Interdisc. Hist. 477 at 482.
23. Backhouse, supra note 3; McLaren, "Chasing the Social Evil," supra note 3; and Larsen,
supra note 3.
24. Bright, supra note 3 at 41.
25. For a discussion of vagrancy legislation in Nova Scotia, see Philips, supra note 3 at 129.
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to consolidate existing criminal legislation during the first stages of the codifica-
tion project. An Act respecting Vagrants was enacted in 1869 and was the first
piece of national legislation attending to vagrancy.26 Thus, post-Confederation
vagrants were subject to legislation enacted at all levels of government."
II. THE IMPETUSES BEHIND CRIMINAL LAW REFORM IN
THE 1950s
Given that it was heavily grounded upon and driven by the common law, Cana-
dian criminal law post-Confederation continued to reflect the law of England,
both in form and in substance. Beginning in 1869, the federal government
sought to consolidate previously existing colonial legislation by enacting a series
of statutes for this purpose.28 However, as historian Desmond Brown has shown,
these initiatives did not go far enough to ensure that the law ceased to exist in
piecemeal form.2 9 In 1891, nearly twenty-five years after Confederation, further
steps were taken to consolidate the law. These later initiatives resulted in Can-
ada's first Criminal Code, which was enacted in 1892.30
26. An Act respecting Vagrants, supra note 15.
27. Philips, supra note 3 at 130. See e.g. Bright, supra note 3 at 48. Here, Bright references a
1912 city of Calgary bylaw. Generally, the "separation of powers" doctrine was not violated
where the objectives of the provinces or municipalities related to matters of a local nature. In
these cases, provinces or municipalities could rely on their "police powers" to attend to these
matters. See Ex ParteAshley (1898), 8 C.C.C. 328 (Qc. Sup. Ct.) [Ex ParteAshley]. With
respect to vagrancy legislation, see R. v. Munroe (1911), 19 C.C.C. 86 (Ont. C.A.) [Munroe];
Presseau v. Paquette, Recorder's Court ofMontreal, Montreal and Attorney-General ofQuebec
(1952), 101 C.C.C. 256 at 260 (Qc. Sup. Ct.) [Presseau]. In Presseau, the court held that a
city of Montreal bylaw designed to enhance the circulation of pedestrian traffic was within
the scope of municipal powers. Two exceptions to the "separation of powers" doctrine are
when the provincial or municipal law overwrites the substance of federal legislation or where
the local legislature seeks to deal with matters concerning public morals. See generally Ex
Parte Ashley at 334-35; Attorney-General for Ontario v. Koynok et al. (1940), 75 C.C.C 100
(Ont. Sup. Ct.).
28. Alan W. Mewett, "The Criminal Law, 1867-1967" (1967) 45 Can. Bar Rev. 726.
29. See Desmond H. Brown, The Genesis ofthe Canadian Criminal Code of 1892 (Toronto: The
Osgoode Society, 1989) c. 5 at 92ff
30. See ibid., c. 6 at 119-48. See also Graham Parker, "The Origins of the Canadian Criminal
Code" in David H. Flaherty, ed., Essays in the History of Canadian Law, vol. I (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1981) at 249.
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The 1892 Code, however, contained several shortcomings, including numer-
ous inconsistencies and ambiguities. It was also unduly verbose and was generally
thought to be archaic.3 ' Exacerbating these problems, the Code was still not the
sole source of criminal law. The myriad federal legislation preserved in the Sched-
ule as well as the common law of each province served to form the entire spectrum
of the criminal law.32 These problems made it clear to members of Parliament
that the Code required betterment. While the Code was consolidated in 1906
and again in 1927,= these modifications did little to alleviate such problems. In
the late 1930s there were further calls for revising the Code. In April of 1938,
for example, the Archambault Commission recommended that a "complete re-
vision of the Criminal Code should be made at once."3 ' However, since law-
makers were preoccupied with the looming world war, and would be so
occupied for nearly seven more years during it, the Commission's recommenda-
tions languished for over a decade. It was only after peace had been secured that
lawmakers turned their attention to domestic matters such as the criminal law.35
In 1949, the Liberals sought sweeping reforms to the criminal law. To a
large extent, this was a response to the persistence of John Diefenbaker and the
Conservatives who had repeatedly called for reform during the two preceding
years." In February of that year, Stuart Garson, the Minister of Justice, an-
nounced the appointment of The Royal Commission on Revision of Criminal
Code, which was ordered to:
31. A. J. MacLeod & J. C. Martin, "The Revision of the Criminal Code" (1955) 33 Can. Bar
Rev. 3 at 3. For further discussions of the shortcomings of the Code, see Brown, supra note
29 at 152-57.
32. Alan W. Mewett & Morris Manning, Mewett 6- Manning on Criminal Law, 3d ed.
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1994) at 6.
33. Don Stuart, Canadian Criminal Law: A Treatise, 4th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Carswell,
2001) at 3.
34. Royal Commission of Canada, Report ofthe Royal Commission to Investigate the Penal System
of Canada (Ottawa: J. 0. Patenaude, 1938) at 358. The Commission was appointed in 1936
to inquire into the Canadian penal system, owing to a fallout that was sparked by a
demonstration led by the inmates of the Kingston Penitentiary in protest against abuse.
When the protest turned riotous within the prison walls, the militia was called in to
intervene and the evidence in its wake has shown not just poor treatment of prisoners, but
also the wilful attempt to kill at least one prisoner on a particular occasion.
35. Brown, supra note 29 at 156.
36. Ibid. at 158.
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(a) revise ambiguous and unclear provisions;
(b) adopt uniform language throughout;
(c) eliminate inconsistencies, legal anomalies or defects;
(d) rearrange provisions and Parts;
(e) seek to simplify by omitting and combining provisions;
(f) with the approval of the Statute Revision Commission, omit provisions
which should be transferred to other statutes;
(g) endeavour to make the Code exhaustive of the criminal law; and
(h) effect such procedural amendments as are deemed necessary for the speedy
and fair enforcement of the criminal law.37
The terms of reference under which the Commission was appointed sug-
gest that its mandate was strictly to address the form of the law, and not its sub-
stance.38 The Commission, in other words, was tasked with "housekeeping";
that is, to tidy, arrange, unify, and simplify the law. Despite these terms of ref-
erence, the Commission made several substantive recommendations. It submit-
ted its final report to the Minister of Justice on 22 January 1954, attaching a
draft bill that had been debated in the House of Commons during the 1953-
1954 legislative session.3 ' The revised Code came into effect in 1955.'o
A. PROSPERITY AND STABILITY IN THE LATE-1 940s AND 1950s CANADA
Many of the reforms to the vagrancy section of the Code were a reflection of the
social and economic climate of that time. The late 1940s and 1950s were cer-
tainly far removed from the turmoil and uncertainty that enveloped the nation
during the dark and grim days of the Depression and World War II. The defin-
ing features of these years are well described by words such as "boom,"
"growth," "progress," "prosperity," and "stability."" However, the emergent
prosperity and stability were both fragile and slow in the making, which meant
37. Royal Commission of Canada, Report ofthe Royal Commission on the Revision of Criminal
Code (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1954) at 3-4.
38. MacLeod & Martin, supra note 31 at 3.
39. Ibid at 8-9.
40. AnAct Respecting the Criminal Law, 1953-1954, 1954, c. 51, s. I [Respecting the Criminal Law].
41. Doug Owram, "Canadian Domesticity in the Postwar Era" in J.L. Granatstein & Peter
Neary, eds., The Veterans Charter and Post- World War II Canada (Montreal & Kingston:
McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998) 205 at 213-14; Joy Parr, "Household Choices as
Politics and Pleasure in 1950s Canada" (1999) 55 Int'l Lab. & Working-Class Hist. 112
at 113-14.
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that a "generalized wariness of excess," as Joy Parr describes, governed the de-
liberations of Canadians who were still nervous about their well-being and wel-
fare." Doug Owram echoes these sentiments when he talks about the relation
between prosperity and the memories of the not-too-distant past:
The depression did not return, but we must be careful not to use the benefit of
hindsight to telescope history. For several years after the war ... prosperity always
seemed fragile. ... Even as it became apparent that prosperity was the dominant
pattern, the memories of recent years remained. There was, indeed, something of a
paradox in the postwar period. Although this was, overall, one of the most pros-
perous periods in Canadian history, only gradually did policy makers and the pub-
lic overcome the wartime fear that the slightest misstep would recreate disaster.4 3
All of this, however, is not to understate the recovery that was well under-
way. The post-war rebuilding saw the birth of the modern welfare state. Begin-
ning with unemployment insurance in 1941 (though its seeds can be traced
back to the 1920s), family allowances in 1945, and Old Age Security in 1951,
various social programs were developed to ensure the well-being of Canadians."
In all, social expenditure grew from $50 per capita in 1947 to $135 per capita
by 1960." The economy was on its way to recovery as well, evinced by the rela-
tively low level of unemployment" and the steadily growing Gross National
Product, which rose from $21 billion in 1951 to $39 billion by 1961.0
It is worth highlighting that the social programs of the 1950s were to be
delivered to the public as a matter of right, rather than as a matter of charity,4 1
42. Parr, ibid. at 114.
43. Owram, supra note 41 at 212-13.
44. James Struthers, "Family Allowances, Old Age Security, and the Construction of
Entitlement in the Canadian Welfare State, 1943-1951" in J.L. Granatstein & Peter Neary,
eds., The Veterans Charter and Post-World War II Canada, supra note 41, 179 at 188-
89, 191.
45. Parr, supra note 41; K. A. H. Buckley & M. C. Urquhart, Historical Statistics of Canada, 2d
ed. (Toronto: MacMillan, 1965) at B270; and F. H. Leacy, Historical Statistics of Canada, 2d
ed. (Ottawa: Statistics Canada and Social Science Federation of Canada, 1983) at Al, D 113,
120, F75, F83, H50.
46. See Daniel Kubat & David Thornton, A Statistical Profile of Canadian Society (Toronto:
McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1974) at 141-42, 145-46.
47. Parr, supra note 41 at 113.
48. Struthers, supra note 44.
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as in previous times." When addressing the House of Commons in 1944,
Prime Minster William Lyon Mackenzie King stated that "the new order is not
going to have things done as charity. What is to be done will be done as a mat-
ter of right."" Thus, prosperity and stability were tied not only to material well-
being, but also to certainty in the legal realm. However, the guarantee of social
welfare had to be earned; it was not to be provided indiscriminately, as was be-
lieved to be the case with the way charity was administered. This shift, as will
become apparent, is significant in making sense of many of the changes to the
vagrancy offences.
III. VAGRANCY LAW REFORM IN THE 1950s
As of 1953, the vagrancy section in the Code contained ten offences." The re-
forms undertaken during the 1953-1954 legislative session led to a reduction in
49. See supra notes 14-26 and accompanying text.
50. House of Commons Debates, (25 July 1944) at 5335 (Hon. James Allison Glen, K.C.)
[emphasis added].
51. An Act respecting Vagrants, supra note 15, contained eight offences (these are a product of my
counting and separating as they were unnumbered in the statute). The Act underwent minor
amendments on two separate occasions, both pertaining to clarifying the punishment. See An
Act to amend 'An Act respecting Vagrants' 1874, c. 43; An Act to remove doubts as to the power
to imprison with hard labour under the Act respecting Vagrants, 188 1, c. 31. See also An Act
respecting Offences against Public Morals and Public Convenience, 1886, c. 157 [Public Morals
and Public Convenience]. This Act was enacted largely to safeguard young girls and women,
whom it was believed, were forced into prostitution both at home and abroad. One section
contained a verbatim description of An Act respecting Vagrants. See Public Morals and Public
Convenience, s. 8. The 1886 Act expanded the number of vagrancy offences in two ways.
First, several earlier offences were split, making them into distinct offences. Secondly, one
new offence was created: "[The] discharging of firearms, or by riotous or disorderly conduct
in any street or highway, wantonly or maliciously disturb[s] the peace and quiet of the
inmates of any dwelling house near such street or highway" (s. 8(g)). This brought the total
number of offences to twelve. Section 8 of this Act was transplanted verbatim into the
vagrancy section of the 1892 Criminal Code. See Criminal Code, S.C. 1892, 55-56 Vict.,
c. 29, ss. 207, 208 [Criminal Code 18921. Other important amendments, discussed below,
occurred between 1906 and 1951. See infra notes 52, 58-62 and accompanying text.
Another notable amendment, that is peripherally relevant here, occurred in 1915. Two
offences of prostitution-keeping a disorderly house, bawdy house, or house of ill fame, and
the frequenting of such places-were removed as offences of vagrancy and inserted into a
separate section of the Code, which carried up to two years in prison. See Revised Statutes of
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the number of offences by half, and took place in two ways. First, five offences
were reclassified and relocated in different sections of the Code. Secondly, four
offences underwent a "facelift," which involved rewriting and fine-tuning their
legal phraseology. One offence, which was added shortly before these reforms,
was not modified." The sum effect of these reforms was twofold. Firstly, the
offence of vagrancy was reconceptualized from a status offence to an offence of
behaviour. Secondly, and relatedly, the ways in which the vagrant was perceived
as a social problem underwent significant changes. I begin with a schematic dis-
cussion of each of these reforms and then explore their significance.
A. RECLASSIFICATION
The following five offences were removed from the vagrancy section of the Code-
(b) being able to work and thereby or by other means to maintain himself or
family, wilfully refuses or neglects to do so;
(c) openly exposes or exhibits in any street, road, highway or public place, any
indecent exhibition;
(d) loiters on any street, road, highway or public place, and obstructs passengers
by standing across the footpath, or by using insulting language, or in any
other way;
(e) by discharging firearms, or by riotous or disorderly conduct in any street or
highway, wantonly disturbs the peace and quiet of the inmates of any dwell-
ing-house near such streets or highway;
(f) tears down or defaces signs, breaks windows, or doors or door plates, or the
walls of houses, roads, or gardens, or destroys fences.5 3
Canada, 1906, c. 146, s. 238(j),(k) as rep. by Statutes of Canada, 1915, c. 5, s. 7. See
McLaren, Anti-White Slavery Campaign, supra note 3 at 331. McLaren explains that these
amendments were an effort to get tough on procures of prostitutes, especially given the
"white slavery panic" that swept the nation during this time. See also Mariana Valverde, The
Age ofLight, Soap and Water: Moral Reform in English Canada, 1885-1925 (Toronto:
McClelland & Stewart, 1991) at 88-89.
52. An amendment in 1951 made it an offence for any person convicted of a particular
enumerated offence to loiter in a specifically listed public space, namely, a school ground,
play ground, public park, or bathing area. See Statutes of Canada, 1951, c. 4 7, s. 13. The
specific offences enumerated were: s. 292(a) indecent assault on a female, s. 293 indecent
assault on a male, s. 301(1) sexually assaulting a girl under the age of fourteen, s. 301(2)
sexually assaulting a girl between the ages of fourteen and sixteen, and s. 302 attempting to
sexually assault a girl under the age of fourteen. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1927 14-15 George
V. c. 36 [Criminal Code 19271.
53. Criminal Code 1927, ibid., ss. 238 (b), (c), (e), (g), (h).
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However, these remained as criminal offences. For example, the fourth provi-
sion, pertaining to causing disturbance, incorporated several earlier vagrancy pro-
visions, such as: loitering and obstructing persons in public places; indecent and
open public exposure; and disturbing the peace and quiet of occupants of a dwell-
ing house by discharging firearms. This section read as follows:
Every one who:
(a) not being in a dwelling house causes a disturbance in or near a public
place,
(i) by fighting, screaming, shouting, swearing, singing or using insult-
ing or obscene language
(ii) by being drunk, or
(iii) by impeding or molesting other persons;
(b) openly exposes or exhibits an indecent exhibition in a public place
(c) loiters in a public place and in any way obstructs persons who are there; or
(d) disturbs the peace and quiet of the occupants of a dwelling house by
discharging firearms or by other disorderly conduct in a public place, is
guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.s5
Similarly, the section relating to indecent exhibition, trespassing at night,
and common nuisance also preserved several earlier vagrancy offences as
criminal offences."
That these offences remained in the Code should not mask the significance
of this shift. Firstly, the stigma attached to, and associated with, being a "loose,
idle or disorderly person or vagrant" no longer applied to these offences, which
meant that those convicted of these offences no longer carried the additional
baggage of being labelled a vagrant." Secondly, these offences were now of-
fences of action, rather than status, which meant that both a guilty act and a
guilty mind were necessary requirements to secure a criminal conviction. This
not only served to enhance due process and fairness, but also made conviction a
more onerous task for the prosecution."
54. Criminal Code, S.C. 1953-1954, 2 Eliz. 2, c. 51, s. 160 [Criminal Code 1953-19541.
55. Ibid ss. 158, 162, 165.
56. See Part III(C), below.
57. Ibid
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B. FACELIFTS
The vagrancy section was.also reformed through "facelifts" to four offences,
which involved editing their legal phraseology. First, the offence of
not having any visible means of subsistence, is found wandering abroad or lodging
in any barn or outhouse, or in any deserted or unoccupied building, or in any car
or wagon, or in any railway carriage or freight car, or in any railway building, and
not giving a good account of himself, or who, not having any visible means of
maintaining himself, lives without employment 58
was rewritten to read: "not having any apparent means of support is found wan-
dering abroad or trespassing and does not, when required, justify his presence in
the place where he is found."" This offence was added to the vagrancy section in
1906,60 in response to the growing numbers and visibility of the poor. Often re-
ferred to as "hoboes," this group of people resorted to barns, outhouses, railway
stations, and railway cars for warmth, lodging, and transportation." However,
due to the economic recovery and prosperity that was well underway, the post-
Depression period witnessed declining numbers and visibility of hoboes.62 As a
result, it appears that by the 1950s, this provision was of limited relevance.
While the above amendment was a response to the changing social and
economic climate of its time, these conditions alone do not fully explain the
legal shifts that were taking place. Wandering and trespassing were left in-
tact as offences of vagrancy, yet the places where they were prohibited were
no longer specified. While the verbosity which plagued this offence was sig-
nificantly improved, virtually any space, be it public or private, was now
58. Criminal Code 1927, supra note 52, c. 36, s. 238(a).
59. Ibid. See also Criminal Code 1953-1954, supra note 54, s. 164(l)(a).
60. Criminal Code 1927, ibid, s. 238(a). This was not a new offence as such, but an expansion of an
older one. Ironically, this was exactly what lawmakers sought, given the Code's terse description
of the offence. See Criminal Code 1892, supra note 51, s. 207(a), which read: "Not having any
visible means of maintaining himself lives without employment."
61. For an interesting US study of hoboes, see Nels Anderson, The Hobo: The Sociology ofthe
Homeless Man (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1923).
62. However, given the limited survey data, it is hard to verify the extent of vagrancy during this
period. See Helen Boritch & John Hagan, "Crime and the Changing Forms of Class
Control: Policing Public Order in 'Toronto the Good,' 1859-1955" (1987) 66 Soc. Forces
307. Boritch and Hagan demonstrate a general decline in the number of arrests for "public
order" offences from the 1920s onwards.
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made off-limits to a person without "apparent means of support." Despite
improvements in the social and economic climate, lawmakers were still of
the opinion that the acts of wandering and trespassing were significant
enough to be dealt with as offences of vagrancy. As a result, the scope of the
section widened considerably.
The offence of begging also underwent a facelift. That offence, which read:
[Anyone who] without a certificate signed, within six months, by a priest, cler-
gyman or minister of the Gospel, or two justices, residing in the municipality
where the alms are being asked, that he or she is a deserving object of charity,
wanders about and begs, or goes about from door to door, or places himself in
any street, highway, passage or public place to beg or receive alms63
was rewritten as: "begs from door to door or in a public place."6 Again,
though the verbosity of the offence was markedly reduced, the scope of the
offence was significantly expanded. Begging was now wholly prohibited, for
the first time in the history of Canadian vagrancy law. Furthermore, the logic
and precedent which guided earlier vagrancy legislation, in terms of granting
particular groups licences or certificates to wander the streets and beg for
alms, was eliminated. Lawmakers believed that since employment was now
more readily available and other forms of support, stemming from the welfare
system, were publicly accessible, this provision would be redundant.65 Having
shed this aspect of its character, Canadian vagrancy law was now strictly con-
cerned with, and designed for, punishment.
The offence of "having no peaceable profession or calling to maintain him-
self by, for the most part supports himself by gaming or crime, or by the avails
of prostitution,"" was the third to undergo a facelift. It was rewritten, less ver-
bosely, as follows: "supports himself in whole or in part by gaming or crime and
has no lawful profession or calling by which to maintain himself."" The reform
to this particular offence was unique because it also incorporated elements of
reclassification. The portion pertaining to "living on the avails of prostitution"
63. Criminal Code 1927, supra note 52, s. 238(d).
64. Ibid.; Criminal Code 1953-1954, supra note 54, s. 164(1)(b).
65. See supra notes 15-16, 48-50, and accompanying text.
66. Criminal Code 1927, supra note 52, s. 238(j).
67. Ibid. See also Criminal Code 1953-1954, supra note 54, s. 164(1)(d).
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was removed as an offence of vagrancy and relocated in the section dealing with
"Disorderly Houses, Gaming and Betting.""
Finally, the offence of "being a common prostitute or night walker, wan-
der[ing] in the fields, public streets or highways, lanes or places of public meeting
or gathering of people, and [not giving] a satisfactory account of herself,"" was
rewritten to read, "being a common prostitute or night walker is found in a pub-
lic place and does not, when required, give a good account of herself."o Here again,
while the verbosity of the offence was reduced, its scope expanded significantly. A
common prostitute or night walker could now be called upon to "give a satisfac-
tory account of herself' in virtually any space, whether it be public or private."
C. FROM "BEING" VAGRANT TO "COMMITTING" VAGRANCY
In many ways, the above reforms addressed the numerous ambiguities surround-
ing important aspects of vagrancy law. Just how problematic the law was is ap-
preciable in the comments of Justice Gait's summary of the offence as it stood
in late 1920s: "It seems curious that such an offence as vagrancy should require
nine separate provisions occupying nearly two pages of the Cr[iminal] Code in
order to define it."72 Prior to the reforms, it was in the courts where many of
68. Criminal Code 1953-1954, ibid., s. 168(1)(b). For a comprehensive overview of this offence
in historical context, see J. Stuart Russell, "The Offence of Keeping a Common Bawdy-
House in Canadian Criminal Law" (1982) 14 Ottawa L. Rev. 270.
69. Criminal Code 1927, supra note 52, s. 238(i).
70. Criminal Code 1927, ibid. See also Criminal Code 1953-1954, supra note 54, s. 164(1)(c).
71. At least discursively, this was an expansion in the scope of the provision, though it appears
that in practice, policing extended into private spaces even before this amendment. See R. v.
Thomas (1949), 96 C.C.C. 129 (Ont. Co. Ct.) [Thomas]. In this case, a common prostitute
was watched by constables while in public, and then followed into a hotel. After locating the
room in which the accused was with her client, and concluding that sexual intercourse had
taken place, one constable followed the accused as she left the hotel and began questioning
her, while the other escorted the client outside to question him. See also McLaren, "Chasing
the Social Evil," supra note 3 at 332-33 (discussing the public-private divide, or the lack
thereof, in relation to prostitution). But see R. v. Dubois (1953), 106 C.C.C. 150 at 153
(Magistrate's Ct.). It was held that a woman could only be asked to give a satisfactory
account of herself when in public, not when confronted in a hotel room, because that meant
that she was no longer wandering. This was regardless of the fact that the first element of the
offence, that she was a common prostitute, had been satisfied. See generally, Part III(C),
below (regarding the ambiguities and inconsistencies surrounding the law).
72. R. v. Rosenfeld (1928), 50 C.C.C. 305 at 306 (Man. K.B.).[Rosenfeld].
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these deficiencies were addressed. Judges settled discrepancies associated with
the constitution of the offence by ruling that it was not "vagrancy," in the broad
sense, that constituted the offence. Instead, it was the particular enumerated
offence within the vagrancy section that constituted the offence.7 ' To charge a
person broadly with vagrancy, Chief Justice Hunter wrote, is akin to "charg[ing]
a man generally with being a thief," because the accused is "entitled to know
under what sub-section he was charged."" This rule was followed to the letter in
later rulings, providing the law with some stability and uniformity." The courts
were also critical when the information provided in the commitment failed to
specify the manner in which the accused contravened the particular offence."
To simply re-state the offence verbatim, as outlined in the subsection, was in-
sufficient; how the accused contravened the particular subsection needed to
have been spelled out clearly, and in detail.7 ' This rule, however, was not uni-
formly applied, leaving the law unsettled and prone to miscarriages of justice.
Thus, the impetus behind the reforms was a strong desire to make the law
clear, precise, and consistent in its application-which is exactly what the Royal
Commission was originally tasked with. The most significant reform to the
criminal law as a whole was the abolishment of all common law offences.7" The
73. See R. v. Keeping (1901), 4 C.C.C. 494 (N.S.S.C.); R. v. McCormack (1903), 7 C.C.C. 135
(B.C..S.C) [McCormack].
74. McCormack, ibid. at 136.
75. See R. v. Harkness (1906), 12 C.C.C. 54 at 55 (Qc. K.B.) [Harkness]; R. v. St. Armand
(1915), 25 C.C.C. 103 at 104 (Ct. of the Sessions of the Peace) [St. Armand]; R. v. Code
(1908), 13 C.C.C. 372 at 378 (Sask. S.C.) [R. v. Code]; R. v.Jackson (1917), 29 C.C.C. 352
at 364 (Ont. S.C.) [Jackson]; R. v. Sheehan (1908), 14 C.C.C. 119 at 120 (B.C. S.C)
[Sheehan]; Rosenfeld, supra note 72 at 306; and R. v. Washington 1935 65 C.C.C. 106 at 108-
09 (B.C. Co. Ct.).
76. See R. v. Leconte (1906), 11 C.C.C. 41 (Ont. C.A.) [Leconte]; Harkness, ibid. at 55; R. v.
Code, ibid. at 378; St. Armand, ibid at 105; and Jackson, ibid. at 371-80, Maagee J.A. &
Clute J., dissenting.
77. R. v. Harris (1908), 13 C.C.C 393 at 395-403 (Y. Terr. Ct.) [Harris]; R. v. Leroy (1940), 73
C.C.C 288 (Alta. S.C.) [Leroy].
78. Leconte, supra note 76; Re Effie Brady (1913), 21 C.C.C. 123 at 127-28 (Alta. S.C.) [Brady]
(holding that to describe how the accused contravened the section in the words of the section
itself is sufficient). See also Jackson, supra note 75 at 95. Here Rose J. (in one of the majority
opinions) noted that the failure to specify the offence "is not to vitiate the count."
79. See Respecting the Criminal Law, supra note 40, s. 1.
RANASINGHE, RECONCEPTUALIZING VAGRANCY 73
key substantive reform to emerge with regard to vagrancy was its re-
conceptualization from an offence of status to one of action.
The vagrancy section of the Code as it existed prior to 1953 read: "Every
one is a loose, idle or disorderly person or vagrant who"" committed a particu-
lar enumerated offence within the section. The offence was, in other words,
that of being vagrant. The reforms led to a rewriting which stated: "Every one
commits vagrancy who ..";"' this discursive shift signalled that vagrancy had be-
come an offence of action, not status. In explaining this shift, opposition MP
Davie Fulton noted that "what is being done now is changing the offence from
one of being to one of doing ... previously the offence was one of being a loose,
idle or disorderly person, or vagrant. Now the offence is specifically made that
of doing something."82 This shift is true of all vagrancy offences, save for being
a common prostitute or night walker (commonly referred to as "Vagrancy C"),
which remained as such until its repeal in 1972." The exception suggests that
whereas particular persons, such as beggars, were thought to be less problem-
atic, common prostitutes and night walkers were still considered to be grave
threats to the social and moral order, similar to how they were perceived in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In addition, due process and fairness
were significantly extended to other "vagrants," such as beggars, but not to
common prostitutes and night walkers, which highlights the gendered nature of
vagrancy law.
This can be appreciated by exploring the concerns that occupied the time and
effort of lawmakers during these debates. These concerns related to two offences:
first, the failure to justify one's presence when found wandering at large without
apparent means of support (commonly referred to as "Vagrancy A");" and second,
though to a far lesser extent, supporting oneself in whole or in part by gaming or
crime and having no lawful profession or calling to maintain one's self.
80. Criminal Code 1927, supra note 52, s. 238.
81. Criminal Code 1953-1954, supra note 54, s. 164(1) [emphasis added].
82. House of Commons Debates, No. 1 (19 February 1954) at 2271 (Hon. L. Ren6 Beaudoin)
[Debates, 19 February 1954].
83. See infra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
84. Criminal Code 1927, supra note 52, ss. 238(a), 238(i). See also the revised offence in
Criminal Code 1953-1954, supra note 54, s. 164 (1) (a).
85. Criminal Code 1927, ibid., ss. 238(j), 238(i). See also the revised offence in Criminal Code
1953-1954, ibid.
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As they stood prior to these reforms, the elements required for conviction
under the vagrancy section were complex and depended on the specific of-
fence." As a whole, what was crucial was that the accused was a "loose, idle or
disorderly person or vagrant.""
Determining whether an accused met this standard required probing into the
general or moral character of the accused-that is, his or her disposition. This was
accomplished by examining whether the accused's lifestyle showed a clear pattern
or course of conduct that was "loose, idle or disorderly or vagrant."" As John
Diefenbaker, the leader of the Opposition, explained, being "loose, idle or disor-
derly or vagrant" entailed "a state of mind that must ... [have been] continuing.""
A hallmark of the criminal law is that a commission of a crime is said to
occur only when both the actus reus and the mens rea are present. This was not
a requirement, however, with regard to vagrancy. Here, the necessary intention
or guilty mind was said to be evident where the accused had bad disposition or
character, which was to be gauged through his or her "course of conduct."
This concerned lawmakers deeply, but its consideration was by implication
only. The focus was not explicitly on the act or guilty mind, but rather on charac-
ter, and that too, for the specific offences named above. What concerned the
86. For example, three elements were necessary to convict a woman for being a common
prostitute: first, that she was a prostitute; second, that she was wandering in public; and
third, that she failed to give a satisfactory account of herself. See Harris, supra note 77; R. v.
Pepper (1909), 15 C.C.C 314 (K.B.) [Pepper]; Brady, supra note 78 at 1; Jackson, supra note
75 at 100; and Thomas, supra note 71. Vagrancy A required three elements as well: first, that
the accused was wandering abroad; second, that the accused lacked apparent means of
support; and third, that the accused failed to give a satisfactory account of himself. See R. v.
Konkin (1949), 95 C.C.C. 373 at 375 (B.C. C.A.).
87. See R. v. Bassett (1884), 10 P.R. 386 at 390 (Ont. C.A.) [Basset]; R. v. Kneeland(1903), 6
C.C.C. 81 at 87 (Qc. K.B.) (holding that the offence relating to causing a disturbance
(s. 207(0) does not apply "to persons of good character"); R. v. Royal (1924), 44 C.C.C. 317
.at 318 (B.C. S.C.) [Royal]; R. v. Law (1924), 42 C.C.C. 123 at 124 (Winnipeg Police Ct.)
[Law] (holding that a "respectable citizen" cannot be convicted for causing a disturbance and
incommoding passengers, under s. 238(0); and R. v. Fleury (1933), 60 C.C.C. 32 at 33-34
(Ont. S.C.) [Fleury].
88. Debates, 19 February 1954, supra note 82 at 2268-71, 2277-80. See also Bassett, ibid. at 390;
Munroe, supra note 27 at 12; Royal, ibid. at 318; Fleury, ibid at 33-34; and R. v. Oiseberg et
al. (1931), 56 C.C.C. 386 (Man. C.A.).
89. Debates, 19 February 1954, ibid. at 2270.
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Opposition about Vagrancy A was the way the proposed changes were drafted.
Originally, a portion of this change was drafted in this way: "Every one commits
vagrancy who (a) not having any apparent means of support (i) lives without em-
ployment.""0 The words "lives without employment" became a concern precisely
because of the proposed omission pertaining to the phrase "loose, idle or disorderly
person or vagrant." The government was of the opinion that this omission would
make Vagrancy A strictly an offence of action. The Opposition, however, argued
that the omission would make unemployment itself sufficient to convict, since the
character of the accused would no longer be accounted for, and there existed a
commonly held belief that the unemployed were inherently criminal. While the
unemployment-criminality nexus was not commonly accepted as fact as it was dur-
ing the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there is evidence that many continued
to equate criminality with the unemployed. For example, the lifestyle of vagrants
was equated with "devious methods" or "criminal work," and their disposition was
equated with a "criminal character."" In describing the vagrant's character, for ex-
ample, the Minister of Justice explained that:
[a vagrant] presumably lives by devious methods which are not apparent on the
surface. ... In other words, it is where a man is idle, living without visible means of
support and yet living ... [T]he mere fact that he is able to live, presumably by ille-
gal methods which cannot be proven, will constitute vagrancy.9
Comments such as these exacerbated the concerns of the Opposition, leading
Diefenbaker to conclude that these changes would simply amount to a "pass-
port to jail because of poverty."93
The Opposition was striving for clarity in these proposed changes, which was
understandable, given the ambiguities, uncertainties, and inconsistent application
of the law. Diefenbaker explained his concerns in the following manner:
I find it difficult to understand why so many changes were made in the vagrancy
section ... . I think that [this change] is widening the law of vagrancy to too great
an extent. In an endeavour to unify [the Code], the law of vagrancy will now cover
90. Ibid. at 2269.
91. Ibid at 2268, 2278. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
unemployment-criminality nexus as it was believed to exist in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries.
92. Ibid. at 2268 [emphasis added].
93. Ibid. at 2270.
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anyone who, not having any a arent means of support, lives without employ-
ment. I believe this goes too far.
Another Opposition member, Fulton, echoed similar sentiments:
[Ylou have taken out the words, "loose, idle or disorderly person", and therefore
all you have to prove is that he lives without employment. My point is that, having
taken out those words, it will no longer be necessary to prove the consistent pat-
tern, because it was owing to the inclusion of those words that the.courts came to
the conclusion that you had to prove a pattern in order to establish vagrancy. ...
All you are going to have to prove [now] is that he lives without employment, and then
he is automatically a vagrant.5
The government took seriously these concerns by repeatedly noting that un-
employment, by itself, was insufficient to establish vagrancy. The Minister ofJus-
tice explained that the phrase "loose, idle or disorderly person" was removed
because of the need to fine-tune the provisions in the Code. "One of the purposes
in the drafting of this new consolidated code" he argued, "was to condense what
over the course of some 60 years had become a pretty voluminous and wordy
document."96 He went on to state: "Since one of the main purposes in redrafting
the consolidated code was to get away from this voluminous and archaic lan-
guage, the ... royal commission employed just the one term 'vagrancy' in this sec-
tion."" He made it clear that "merely being without employment does not
constitute the [vagrancy] offence. The offence is this course of conduct."" In an
attempt to assure the Opposition that this would be the basis upon which a con-
viction would be successful, he went on to say that "in every instance [court cases]
were decided by a course of conduct, and they will continue to be decided by a
course of conduct when referring to the gentleman as a vagrant.""
This was indeed true. Often the courts held the following to be irrelevant
in gauging the character of the accused: that the person was from out of town
and unknown to authorities, or unemployed "on one day or more";" or that
94. Ibid. at 2269.
95. Ibid at 2281 [emphasis added].
96. Ibid. at 2271.
97. Ibid. at 2272.
98. Ibid. at 2277.
99. Ibid. at 2278.
100. Basset, supra note 87 at 389.
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the accused maintained himself without lawful profession.o' Similarly, failing
to accept available work on the grounds that it would hinder the possibility of
finding better work did not show the character of that person to be disreputa-
ble.102 In fact, evidence of previous employment was sufficient to show a reputa-
ble or satisfactory character.' In sum, unemployment was only relevant where
the accused "live[d] by trickery and cheating and by preying upon other men."'os
In all of these cases, it was the character of the accused that was crucial in
determining innocence or guilt. That this would no longer be a point of con-
sideration gravely concerned the Opposition. In addition, there were many as-
pects related to this offence that were unclear. On one occasion, the fact that an
accused was unable to justify his presence after being arrested for wandering
"without apparent means of support" was interpreted as indicative that he was a
"loose, idle or disorderly person or vagrant."'s In other cases, what constituted
having visible means of maintenance was narrowly interpreted: income received
through prostitution was disregarded,'0 6 and so was the money gained from beg-
ging.' Thus, where money was received through disreputable means or from a
temporary source, an accused was found to not possess any visible means of main-
tenance. Yet, in at least one instance, money received through gambling was taken
as a sign that the accused had visible means of maintenance.'
In an effort to placate and reassure the Opposition, and perhaps recogniz-
ing many of the inconsistencies with the application of the law, the Minister of
Justice stated that the government was willing to reinstate the phrase "loose,
101. R. v. Riley (1898), 2 C.C.C 129 at 129-30 (Qc. Q.B.) [Riley].
102. Fleury, supra note 87 at 33-34.
103. See R.v. Collette (1905), 10 C.C.C. 286 at 286-87. (Ont. H.C.).
104. Riley, supra note 101 at 130.
105. R. v. Kolenczuk (1914), 23 C.C.C. 265 (Sask. Sup. Ct.). However, the prisoner was
discharged because the commitment failed to describe an offence (at 265-66).
106. R. v. Cyr (Alias Waters) (1917), 29 C.C.C. 77 at 88 (Alta. S.C.). Prostitution was said to be
unlawful, and not "honest and reputable," and therefore "subject to condemnation by the
ordinary moral standards of the community."
107. Munroe, supra note 27. It appears that this was because the accused did not have a signed
certificate allowing him to beg. Yet, the court also ruled that "[b]egging is stamped as being a
disreputable mode of life" because a "man who makes a living by begging ... is not regarded
as a person who maintains himself by honest work or other lawful. means" (at 87-88).
108. Sheehan, supra note 75.
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idle or disorderly person."' 0 9 In the end, however, this change failed to material-
ize because both the government and the various opposition parties spent con-
siderable time haggling over exactly where to place the phrase within the
section.'o While only speculative, this raises an interesting possibility that, had
the parties agreed upon a way to include this phrase, Vagrancy A would have
remained an offence of status. However, the Opposition was successful in per-
suading the government to remove the phrase "lives without employment" in
Vagrancy A," which ensured that unemployment itself would not constitute
the offence.
The detailed attention that lawmakers paid to Vagrancy A, and to a lesser
extent, the related offence discussed above, suggests a strong commitment to-
ward clarifying the proposed changes and establishing certainty in the new law.
The fact that it was largely Vagrancy A that was scrutinized in this way, is in-
formative and sheds light on the ways the vagrant was perceived as a social
problem. At least discursively, unemployment was no longer viewed as a grave
threat to social order, nor were the unemployed necessarily viewed as habitual
criminals. Unemployment was a reflection of the inability to find work, as op-
posed to the recalcitrance towards work.
Yet, the offence of being a common prostitute or night walker (Vagrancy
C) was not the subject of such concern. Prostitutes and night walkers were
still caught by the law based largely, if not solely, on their status, and they
were viewed similarly to how they had been regarded during the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. Like Vagrancy A, Vagrancy C was subject to
the same ambiguities and inconsistent applications. While the courts sought
to rectify these issues," 2 widespread problems still prevailed."' As Harris ex-
plains, even more troubling was the fact that common prostitutes and night
109. Debates, 19 February 1954, supra note 82 at 2272.
110. Ibid. at 2272-75.
111. House of Commons Debates, No. I (15 March 1954) at 3005 (Hon. L. Rend Beaudoin); See
Criminal Code 1953-1954, supra note 54, s. 164(1)(a).
112. In many instances, following the rule of other vagrancy offences, convictions were quashed
or the defendant discharged on the grounds that no offence was described in the
commitment. See Harris, supra note 77; Pepper, supra note 86; Leroy, supra note 77; and see
also Larsen, supra note 3 at 149-54.
113. See Brady, supra note 78.
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walkers were classified as a different type of vagrant. While the law provided
prostitutes and night walkers
as much right to walk in the streets as any other person, provided they are not so
walking for immoral purposes ... [it] limit[ed] the right of this class of people to walk
in the streets, inasmuch as any police officer, knowing what their character is, may
accost them and demand an explanation which he is not at liberty to demand of any
other citizen. 14
The broad reach of the offence made being a common prostitute or night
walker a unique vagrancy offence, and illustrates the gendered nature of va-
grancy law."'
IV. THE IMPETUSES BEHIND CRIMINAL LAW REFORM IN
THE 1970s
The reforms undertaken in the early 1970s were concerned with the substance
of the law and in particular, with its appropriate function and purpose in a free
and democratic society. This had become an important point of consideration
in academic and political thinking beginning in the 1960s. The seeds of this
concern were sowed in the United Kingdom in the late 1950s, when the Report
of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution (also termed the
"Wolfenden Report") unequivocally stated that the criminal law should not be
utilized to address private activities between consenting adults, regardless of
how immoral these might be, or perceived to be."' The Wolfenden Report
concerned itself with:
(a) the law and practice relating to homosexual offences and the treatment of
persons convicted of such offences by the courts; and
114. Harris, supra note 77 at 396-97 [emphasis added]. See also Pepper, supra note 86.
115. The cases reported post-195 4 are informative. See e.g. R. v. Fiddler (1964), 46 W.W.R. 676
(B.C. Co. Ct.). In this case, the British Columbia County Court continued to follow in the
same line of reasoning as had earlier cases, by focusing on-and heavily scrutinizing-the
accused's "course of conduct" in order to gauge her character. See Larsen, supra note 3; see
also infa notes 139-45, 160-77, and accompanying text.
116. U.K., The Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, The Wolfenden Report
(London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1963).
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(b) the law and practice relating to offences against the criminal law in connec-
tion with prostitution and solicitation for immoral purposes.117
Its most significant recommendation was for homosexual relations between
consenting adults to be decriminalized, a groundbreaking recommendation at
that time. The sphere of "private morality" should not be the business of the
criminal law, the Committee noted, unless public order-pertaining to inde-
cency, offensive and injurious matters, exploitation and corruption, for exam-
ple-is jeopardized."' Following this line of reasoning, the Wolfenden Report
recommended the regulation, rather than decriminalization, of street prostitu-
tion, because it was considered "deplorable in the eyes of moralists ... and ... the
great majority or ordinary people.""'
The significance of these recommendations is illustrated in the 1960s de-
bate between Lord Patrick Devlin and the noted Oxford legal philosopher,
H.L.A. Hart.120 This famous debate served as a microcosm of the broader con-
cerns about the appropriate function and uses of the criminal law. While it
would be incorrect to say that this issue was directly responsible for the reforms
undertaken in the 1970s, it played a significant role in spearheading reform, or,
at least, bringing to light the need for dialogue regarding the law.
A good example of this can be found in the vagrancy ordinances that existed
in the United States during the 1970s. While vagrancy ordinances had been
deprecated in academia since about the mid-twentieth century,12 1 and on several
117. Ibid. at para. 1.
118. Ibid at para. 13.
119. Ibid. at para. 225 [emphasis added). See also Joe Phoenix, "Governing Prostitution: New
Formations, Old Agendas" (2007) 22 C.J.L.S. 73 at 77-80.
120. For a useful overview, see Basil Mitchell, Law, Morality, and Religion in a Secular Society
(London: Oxford University Press, 1967).
121. See John Lisle, "Vagrancy Law; Its Faults and their Remedy" (1914) 5 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 498; Arthur H. Sherry, "Vagrants, Rogues and Vagabonds-Old Concepts in
Need of Revision" (1960) 48 Cal. L. Rev. 557; Gary V. Dubin & Richard H. Robinson,
"The Vagrancy Concept Reconsidered: Problems and Abuses of Status Criminality" (1962)
37 N.Y.U.L. Rev, 102; and Anthony G. Amsterdam, "Federal Constitutional Restrictions on
the Punishment of Crimes of Status, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of
Displeasing Police Officers, and the Like" (1967) 3 Crim. L. Bull. 205.
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occasions successfully challenged in the courts, 22 it was not until the 1970s
when this matter was definitively resolved in the United States. The landmark
case is Papachristou et a. v. City ofJacksonville'23 in which the US Supreme Court
struck down a Jacksonville, Florida vagrancy ordinance because it was void for
vagueness and "plainly unconstitutional."'24 It gave two reasons. Firstly, the or-
dinance failed to provide persons of ordinary intelligence with fair and clear no-
tice that their contemplated conduct was prohibited by law.' Secondly, it
effectively gave police "unfettered discretion, (which] permits and encourages
an arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law."'26 In striking down the
ordinance, the Court spoke against the capricious and arbitrary use of the law
to harass the poor and other minorities. It rearticulated the importance of the
rule of law, "the great mucilage that holds society together,"12 7 to set limits on
the appropriate.uses of the law in similar ways that the Wolfenden Report had
done some fifteen years earlier.
While it is not clear whether and to what extent the rulings in the US
courts had any bearing on these legal shifts occurring in Canada,128 it requires
underscoring that it was precisely during this period that the concerns over va-
grancy legislation were resolved definitively in both countries. To some extent,
this was because of the concerns that had arisen regarding the appropriate uses
of the criminal law in a free and democratic society. In the Canadian context,
two additional factors played an influential role in criminal law reformation,
one having a direct bearing on vagrancy law.
122. See "The Growth of Disorder" in Catherine M. Coles & George L. Kelling, Fixing
Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1996) 38 at 49-60; Garry Stewart, "Black Codes and Broken
Windows: The Legacy of Racial Hegemony in Anti-Gang Civil Injunctions" (1998)
107 Yale L.J. 2249 at 2262-63.
123. 92 S. Ct. 839 (1972).
124. Ibid. at para. 171.
125. Ibid. at para. 1.
126. Ibid. at para. 170.
127. Ibid. at para. 171.
128. The parliamentary debates and case law are silent as to what was taking place in the
United States.
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A. LIBERTY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF
PIERRE TRUDEAU
Pierre Trudeau has been described "as the most extraordinary thinker to ever
become Prime Minister of Canada,"129 and has "more than any other person
influenced the course of Canadian history in the twentieth century.""' In 1967,
when Trudeau was the Minister of Justice, he introduced a Divorce Reform
Bill and other amendments to the Code, including the decriminalization of
homosexuality and abortion.'"' These reforms were the beginning of what Tru-
deau had in mind, which he promoted under the banner-which has now be-
come a famous dictum that is synonymous with Trudeau himself-that "the
state has no place in the bedrooms of the nation."' Echoing the major conclu-
sions of the Wolfenden Report, Trudeau's philosophy sought to redraw the
boundaries of the state, inclusive of the criminal law. This became the corner-
stone upon which Trudeau's policies would be shaped when he became Prime
Minister in 1968.
The law and lawmaking, as Trudeau noted in a speech that he delivered in
1968, "is a way to improve the lot of flesh and blood of human beings.""' This
involved maximizing freedom, what Trudeau named as "the most important
value of a just society,""' but in a way that was sensitive to the needs of the
people. Thus, in Trudeau's vision, liberty, and social justice were inextricably
129. John L. Hiemstra, Trudeau's Political Philosophy: Its Implications for Liberty and Progress
(Toronto: Institute for Christian Studies, 1983) at 1.
130. James Bickerton, Stephen Brooks & Alain-G. Gagnon, Freedom, Equality, Community: The
Political Philosophy ofSix Influential Canadians (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's
University Press, 2006) at 119.
131. Stephen Clarkson & Christina McCall, Trudeau and our Times: The Magnificent Obsession
(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1990) vol. I at 107.
132. Interview of Pierre Elliott Trudeau (21 December 1967) Trudeau's Omnibus Bill:
Challenging Canadian Taboos, CBC Digital Archives, online: <http://archives.cbc.calpolitics/
rights freedoms/topics/538/>.
133. Jacques Hibert, "Legislating for Freedom" trans. by Patricia Claxton in Thomas S. Axworthy
and Pierre Elliott Trudeau, eds., Towards a Just Society: The Trudeau Years (Markham,
Ontario: Viking, 1990) at 147, citing Trudeau (Ottawa: Deneau Publishers, 1984).
134. Pierre Elliott Trudeau, "The Values of a Just Society" trans. by Patricia Claxton in Thomas
S. Axworthy & Pierre Elliott Trudeau, eds., Towards aJust Society: The Trudeau,Years, ibid.
at 357.
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linked. Based on these values, the criminal law was to be reserved for serious
problems, not to police popular morality or sin. For example, after introducing
bills to decriminalize homosexuality and abortion Trudeau stated:
I believe that the criminal code amendrients are good because they try to instill in
our legal concept that there is a difference between sin and crime, and it is not the
business of the lawmaker or of the police to check sin. This is a problem for each
person's conscience, or his Priest, or his God, but not for the police.135
Trudeau's philosophy explicitly distinguished between crime and morality,
in the same way that the Wolfenden Report had done. The separation of the
two would become an important foundation for undertaking future criminal
law reform.
B. THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN
The Report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canadal36 (the
"Report") was, in many ways, directly responsible for the reformation of va-
grancy legislation in the early 1970s. The Commission was convened in Feb-
ruary of 1967, while Trudeau was still the Minister of Justice. During
Trudeau's time in government, many groups in Canada who had hitherto
been provided little access to voice their opinions and concerns were now
provided with this opportunity.' Where women were concerned, this was
especially the case; in the "Trudeau years," women's rights were significantly
expanded and progress was made in building upon the platform that suffra-
gists such as Nellie McClung had fought for in the early twentieth century. A
good example of this was the appointment, in 1971, of a Minister who was to
be responsible for the status of women and a Status of Women Coordinator,
with the aim of developing a coherent policy for women based on their needs
and interests.'
135. Quoted in Hibert, supra note 133 at 145.
136. Royal Commission of Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women
(Ottawa: Crown Copyrights, 1970) [Report on the Status of Women].
137. H6bert, supra note 133 at 132.
138. Ibid. at 133. The Law Reform Commission of Canada was also formed at this time, in June
of 1971. The Commission was required to "prepare and submit to the Minister [of Justice]
from time to time detailed programs for the study of particular laws or branches of the law
with a view to making recommendations for their improvement, modernization and reform."
See The Law Reform Commission of Canada, The First Research Program of the Law Reform
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The Commission was ordered to 'inquire into ... the status of women in
Canada ... to ensure for women equal opportunities with men in all aspects of
Canadian society"'"" The Report unequivocally highlighted the unequal
status of women in Canadian society, especially as it related to the way they
entered and were processed through the Criminal Justice System: "young
[and marginalized] girls who move from rural areas to the urban centres [are
often] alone and without money ... and ill-equipped to find a job. In many
cases, they are picked up by the police on vagrancy charges and may conse-
quently acquire the stigma of a criminal record."'" The Report also stated
that "[w]omen are increasingly convicted of 'crimes without victims.' These
are offences where, if any harm is caused, it is to the offender herself and not
directly to others."' Prostitution was the offence highlighted for discussion
and criticism. The "[p]roblems raised by the law dealing with prostitutes de-
serve special attention," the Report noted, and added: "[p]rostitution itself is
not a crime ... prostitutes are controlled by the vagrancy provisions of the
Criminal Code."' 2 The Report highlighted the problems associated with the
way women were charged, as well as the fact that this practice was inherently
gendered. The Commission noted that the vagrancy provision pertaining to
prostitution failed to "respect the liberty of the individual to move about in
freedom. Furthermore it opens the door to arbitrary application of the law by
the police and it favours setting up traps, sometimes using police officers as
agents provocateurs to arrest so-called prostitutes. 
1 4 3
Commission of Canada (Ottawa: Information.Canada, 1972) at 5. Specifically, with regard to
the criminal law, the Commission was tasked with examining "the types of conduct that
should be made subject to the criminal law; the analysis of the objectives to be obtained by
the imposition of criminal sanctions; the finding of alternative techniques for regulating
conduct without resorting to the criminal law ... ." See The Law Reform Commission of
Canada, The First Annual Report of the Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1971-1972
(Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1972) at 8. It is not clear whether the recommendations of
the Commission impacted the reforms to vagrancy legislation, though it would appear that
this was not the case, given that the first reports were tabled after the reforms had come into
effect.
139. Report on the Status of Women, supra note 136 at ix.
140. Ibid. at 314.
141. Ibid. at 366.
142. Ibid. at 369.
143. Ibid. at 370 [emphasis in original].
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Thus, the members of the Commission wrote that they were "concerned
about the use of vagrancy in the criminal law ... to regulate the activity of
women prostitutes,"1" and called for the cessation of this practice. In so doing,
the Report explicitly stated that many of the activities considered "criminal"
during the time under consideration should not properly fall within the domain
of the criminal law. This was a point that was forcefully and repeatedly taken
up later by parliamentarians during the legislative debates:
[T]he criminal law in Canada is built upon a nineteenth century philosophy of the
role of punishment in the control of anti-social behaviour. Behaviour that was con-
sidered a threat to society in the nineteenth century and accordingly subjected to the
criminal law and its sanctions is not necessarily, in the mid-twentieth century, the
kind of behaviour that should be subject to criminal sanctions.i15
V. VAGRANCY LAW REFORM IN THE 1970s
As of 1955, the vagrancy section of the Code contained five offences:
Every one commits vagrancy who
(a) not having any apparent means of support is found wandering abroad or
trespassing and does not, when required, justify his presence in the place
where he is found;
(b) begs from door to door or in a public place;
(c) being a common prostitute or nightwalker is found in a public place and does
not, when required, give a good account of herself;
(d) supports himself in whole or in part by gaming or crime and has no lawful
profession or calling by which to maintain himself; or
144. Ibid. at 371.
145. Ibid at 365. The recommendations in the Report on the Status of Women also focused on the
provision relating to having "no apparent means of support." The Commission was clearly of
the opinion that this particular prpvision was more adverse to women than men because it was
directed at the homeless and transient, both male and female, who have no apparent means
of support and cannot justify their presence in the place in which they are found. Even
though they have committed no offence, many young girls are arrested and charged with va-
grancy, simply because they do not have homes or money or because there is no place to send
them for the night. It is relatively easy for homeless men to find shelter in hostels in most
large cities but there are a few hostels for women (at 365).
This was yet another example of the gendered nature of vagrancy legislation.
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(e) having at any time been convicted of an offence under a provision mentioned in
paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection 1 of section 661, is found loitering or wander-
ing in or near a school ground, playground, public park or bathing area.14
A person convicted under this section would be "guilty of an offence punish-
able on summary conviction.
Three offences were decriminalized in 1972,'14 namely: wandering in pub-
lic without apparent means of support (Vagrancy A), begging, and being a
common prostitute or night walker (Vagrancy C).'" Thus, as of 1973, the va-
grancy section read:
Every one commits vagrancy who
(a) supports himself in whole or in part by gaming or crime and has no lawful
profession or calling by which to maintain himself; or
(b) having at any time been convicted of an offence under a provision mentioned
in paragraph 689(1)(a) or (b), is found loitering or wandering in or near a
school ground, playground, public park or bathing area.15 0
At the time of writing, these offences can still be found in the Code,'51
though the latter offence has been rendered inoperative through judicial in-
terpretation.152
146. Criminal Code 1953-1954, supra note 54, s. 164(1.) For discussion pertaining to section (e),
see supra note 52.
147. Ibid, s. 164(2).
148. Criminal Law Amendment Act, S.C. 1972, c. 13, s. 12.
149. While prostitution was decriminalized, solicitation for the purposes of prostitution was
enacted as a criminal offence in the same Bill. See Criminal Law Amendment Act, ibid., s. 15;
see also infra notes 160-81 and accompanying text.
150. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 175(1) (d), (e) [Criminal Code 1970].
151. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 179(1) (a), (b) [Criminal Code 19851.
152. R. v. Heywood (1994), 3 S.C.R. 761. Writing the majority opinion for the Court, Justice
Cory noted that "[tihere can be no question that [the impugned section] restricts the liberty
of those to whom it applies" (at para. 45). This restriction, he explained, violated principles
of fundamental justice; namely, the protections afforded under section 7 of the Charter with
regards to life, liberty, and security, and could not be saved under a section 1 analysis. To a
large extent, this was because the section was overly broad, in four related ways: first, with
respect to its geographical ambit; second, with respect to its prescription of a lifetime
prohibition without the possibility of review; third, with respect to its enumeration of a large
group of people; and finally, with respect to its application to the accused without prior
notice (see paras. 55-68).
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These reforms reconceptualized vagrancy in important ways, though what
is also significant is the particular ways in which these reforms took place.
Broadly conceived, the vagrant was no longer considered a threat to the social
and moral order of the nation. Thus, the criminal law was deemed inappropri-
ate to attend to the potential concerns posed by these three classes of vagrants.
As MP John Gilbert explained:
[M]any of the offences mentioned in the code are not criminal in the real sense of
that word. I have in mind offences such as vagrancy ... [and] prostitution. ... Surely
they do not belong in the Criminal Code. I think it is time that we realized that
the origin of many of these ... problems are social rather than criminal in nature.153
According to MP Andrew Brewin, these changes were concerted efforts to
"make ... the criminal law modern, up to date, compassionate and remedial,"
which would require "repealling] ... those provisions dealing with vagrancy and
prostitution" which were "long overdue."'" Concerns about justice were also a
feature of these reforms; MP Gilbert asserted that "Canada need[ed] a more con-
temporary criminal law, one which [would be] credible, enforceable, flexible and
compassionate.""' Specifically, the uneven application of the law between differ-
ent classes of persons was repeatedly raised. According to the Minister of Justice,
Otto E. Lang, "changes are necessary in order to try in some way to attain greater
fairness in our law as applied to the privileged and to those who are less privi-
leged, to the rich and to the poor.""' This, according to MP David Macdonald,
required drawing a "distinction between morality and the law," given that "it is
not possible to impose one uniform moral code on a country anymore."' 57
These issues reflected many of those raised in the Wolfenden Report about
the appropriate role and function of the criminal law. As well, these concerns bear
close resemblances to the political philosophy of Trudeau. The following words
of the Minister of Justice could easily have been spoken by Trudeau himself:
153. House of Commons Debates, No. 4 (27 April 1972) at 1703 (Hon. Lucien Lamoureaux, MP)
[Debates, 27 April 1972]. There were exceptions, but these were aberrations and did not
sway the views of most politicians, regardless of party affiliations; see e.g. the comments of
MP Marcel Lambert, 28 April 1972 at 1725 [Debates, 28 April 1972], and MP Douglas
Hogarth, 1 May 1972 at 1775 [Debates, I May 1972].
154. Debates, 28 April 1972, ibid. at 1724.
155. Debates, 27 April 1972, supra note 153 at 1703.
156. Ibid. at 1699.
157. Debates, 2 May 1972, supra note 153 at 1815.
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In all of these moves to amend the law we have been conscious of the view that
there is an important distinction between law and morality, that not everything
which some of us may regard as wrong or undesirable need be included within the
prohibitions of the law. The law does not have to interfere in everything that is re-
garded as wrong: it need not be overzealous in this regard.158
It is not the case, however, that these offences were thought to be unprob-
lematic. What was problematic was the reliance on the criminal law to deal
with matters that municipalities or provinces would be better equipped to ad-
dress, given their local or parochial nature. In addition, given the belief that
these matters were not so grave to the national interests, the criminal law was
deemed too punitive a measure to rely on. With respect to begging in particu-
lar, the Minister of Justice stated:
[T]he sections dealing with vagrancy here are being repealed as really being too
vague for the purposes of the criminal law. With respect to the vagrancy offence of
begging, it is not considered that this is a proper matter to continue as part of the
criminal law. We believe that if legislation is needed in this regard, it would be
best to have it by way of municipal bylaw or provincial legislation.' 5 9
With respect to the offence of prostitution, what transpired is complicated.
Facially, the concerns about justice, including the consistent application of the
law and the separation of law and morality, were extended to prostitution as
well. Unlike begging, however, the legislators believed that the criminal law
should continue to regulate prostitution. This was because it was not the law
itself that was said to be the problem, but the particular ways in which it was
deployed. Thus, the same Bill that decriminalized prostitution also enacted a
new offence: anyone "who solicits any person in a public place for the purpose of
prostitution is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.".o This
offence decoupled prostitution from morality, though it justified the use of the
criminal law by constructing prostitution as a "social nuisance."
158. Debates,.27 April 1972, ibid. at 1699. Compare this quote with that of Trudeau's statement
regarding the decriminalization of homosexuality and abortion. Supra note 135 and
accompanying text.
159. House of Commons Debates, Minutes of the Proceedings and Evidence on Justice and Legal
Affairs, May 9 at (5)35.
160. Criminal Law Amendment Act, supra note 148, s. 15 [emphasis added]; Criminal Code,
R.S.C. 1970, supra note 150.
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To locate the significance of decriminalizing prostitution, a brief discussion
of what transpired after is in order."' A few years after coming into effect, the
"soliciting law" was challenged in court. In a landmark ruling, the Supreme
Court of Canada interpreted the word "solicit" to be synonymous with the act
of accosting or importuning in a manner that is pressing or persistent.'62 In
other words, to contravene the law, a prostitute would have to solicit in a man-
ner that was deemed pressing or persistent. It appears that this ruling severely
hindered the ability of the police to lay charges because they believed the law
was now unclear and thus, unenforceable."' While the data does not necessarily
corroborate it, the perception was that this led to a proliferation of street prosti-
tution across the country."' The government responded to these concerns by
setting up two committees to explore the problem of prostitution and provide
recommendations.' 65 Though they disagreed somewhat, both the Badgley
161. This discussion is not intended to explore the post-1972 responses to prostitution in detail,
but to highlight the significance of decriminalization.
162. R. v. Hutt (1978), 2 S.C.R. 476 at para. 17 [Hutt].
163. To compound this problem, the Court also ruled that a private vehicle, where the appellant
solicited an undercover police officer, was not a public space within the meaning of the
legislation. See ibid. at para. 6.
164. See John Lowman, "Prostitution in Canada" in Margaret A. Jackson & Curt T. Griffiths,
eds., Canadian Criminology: Perspectives on Crime and Criminality, 2d ed. (Toronto:
Harcourt Brace and Co., 1995) 333 at 345 [Lowman, "Prostitution in Canada"]. Lowman
suggests that while the number of charges for soliciting declined significantly after Hutt, this
decline had begun in 1975. See also John Lowman, "Street Prostitution" in Vincent F.
Sacco, ed., Deviance: Conformity and Control in Canadian Society (Scarborough: Prentice-
Hall, 1988) 54 at 80-82 [Lowman, "Street Prostitution"). In "Street Prostitution," the
decline in charges is discussed in more detail, using Vancouver as an example..See also
Monique Layton, "The Ambiguities of the Law or the Streetwalker's Dilemma" (1979) 27
Chitty's L.J. 109 at 113-16 (suggesting that the various rulings pre-Hutt tended to
problematize the very meaning of the word "solicit," thereby causing uneasiness among the
police.) Regardless, charges had begun to diminish before the Hutt ruling in Vancouver. In
Toronto, however, it seems that the "soliciting law" was frequently enforced until the early
1980s. See Lowman, "Street Prostitution" at 80.
165. See The Committee on Sexual Offences Against Children and Youth, Sexual Offences Against
Children (Ottawa: Department of Supply and Services, 1984). This Committee was
appointed in 1981 and was commonly referred to as the "Badgley Committee." See also The
Special Committee on Pornography and Prostitution, Pornography and Prostitution in
Canada (Ottawa: Department of Supply and Services, 1985). This Committee was
appointed in 1983 and was commonly referred to as the "Fraser Committee."
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Committee and the Fraser Committee agreed that a "unilateral implementation
of a law outlawing prostitution""' should not be implemented. In fact, the Fra-
ser Committee was explicit in its position that a meaningful solution to prosti-
tution-for both prostitutes and residents-could not materialize until the law
prescribed, rather than proscribed, specific public spaces where prostitutes
could legally work."' However, the government ignored this key recommenda-
tion, opting instead to repeal the "soliciting law" and enact a new offence that
criminalized communication for the purposes of prostitution. This offence,
generally referred to as the "communicating law," reads:
Every person who in a public place or in any place open to public view
(a) stops or attempts to stop any motor vehicle,
(b) impedes the free flow of pedestrian or vehicular traffic or ingress to or
egress from premises adjacent to that place, or
(c) stops or attempts to stop any person in any manner communicates or at-
tempts to communicate with any person
for the purpose of engaging in prostitution or of obtaining the sexual services of
a prostitute is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction. 16 8
The "communicating law" was explicitly concerned with addressing the
twin problems which plagued the "soliciting law," relating to the ambiguity of
the offence and by extension, the difficulties with enforcement. The new law
continued in the tradition of the "soliciting law" which had defined prostitu-
tion as a "social nuisance." In fact, the "communicating law" not only reaf-
firmed this, but did so by inscribing a more expansive reach than its
predecessor. First, the new law covered not just prostitutes, as did the "solicit-
ing law," but also those who sought to purchase sexual services-that is, prosti-
tutes' clients. Indirectly, this addition attended to one of the concerns that the
Royal Commission had raised some fifteen years before about the vagrancy
166. Lowman, "Street Prostitution," supra note 164 at 92. For a good overview of these
recommendations, see also Deborah H. Brock, Making Work, Making Trouble: Prostitution as
a Social Problem (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998) c. 4, 6 at 60-74, 101-16.
167. John Lowman, "Prostitution Law in Canada" (1989) 23 Comparative L. Rev. 12 at 25.
168. Criminal Code, S.C. 1986, c. C-34, s. 195.1(1). The offence is now found in s. 213.1(1)(c); see
Criminal Code 1985, supra note 151, c. C-46. See also Brock, supra note 166 at 66-72 (discussing
in great detail the similarities and differences between what the Fraser Committee recommended
with respect to s. 195(1) and what eventually materialized in the government bill).
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provision pertaining to prostitution-that the clients of prostitutes were not
held liable for the purchase of sexual services.' The addition was driven pri-
marily by the desire to provide law enforcement with the necessary tools to at-
tend to street prostitution, one aspect of that now being the ability to target
the consumers of sex.'70 Secondly, and relatedly, the new law covered not only
communication for the purposes of prostitution or obtaining sexual services,
but also any attempt aimed at such purposes. Together, these additions served
in many ways both to clarify the law, and ease the burdens associated with
law enforcement. In so expanding the scope of the provision, the "communicat-
ing law" further inscribed and reaffirmed the notion that prostitution consti-
tuted a "social nuisance," thereby justifying the use of the criminal law to
attend to this matter.'7
There is wide agreement that prostitution is indeed a social nuisance, and poses
great inconveniences to residents.'72 However, it is the ways that prostitution has
been attended to that have come under severe scrutiny and criticism. The "soliciting
law" and the later "communicating law" have been the subject of deprecation, deri-
sion, and disdain in academic circles, notably for valuing property and norms of
civility at the expense of the interests and needs of the women who work as prosti-
tutes.173 While prostitution remains ostensibly legal, virtually every aspect associated
169. Report on the Status of Women, supra note 136 at 369-70.
170. Brock, supra note 166 at 75-78.
171. In 1990, the Supreme Court held that the "communicating law" was constitutionally sound.
See Refrrence re. ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man) (1990), 1 S.C.R. 1123
[Prostitution Reference]. Dickson C.J.C, who wrote the majority opinion for the Court, noted
that the public display of the sale of sexual services is a social nuisance that poses a variety of
concerns to passersby and bystanders and that the eradication of it via the criminal law was a
pressing and substantial concern. Interestingly, the dissenting opinion of Wilson J. noted
that prostitution was indeed a social nuisance, which as she saw it however, did not require
the punitive measures afforded by the criminal law, and the reliance on this means rendered
the law constitutionally suspect.
172. This is true even of many feminists who otherwise call for the decriminalization of
prostitution. See Dianne Martin, "Prostitution Bill C-19: Reforming the Criminal Law"
(1984) 16 Ottawa L. Rev. 400 at 401; Frances M. Shaver, "Prostitution: A Critical Analysis
of Three Policy Approaches" (1985) 11 Can. Pub. Pol'y 493 at 500. See also Wilson J.'s
dissenting opinion in Prostitution Reference, ibid.
173. Lowman, "Street Prostitution," supra note 164 at 91; Martin, ibid.; Shaver, ibid.; and
Layton, supra note 164.
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with it is illegal. As a result, the "soliciting law" was, and the current "communicat-
ing law" is, said to be discriminatory, hypocritical, and contradictory."'
I do not intend to minimize the problems associated with the post- 1972 efforts
to address prostitution, though these problems should not be used to mask the sig-
nificance of decriminalization. According to Justice Spence's summary of the va-
grancy phase and the post-vagrancy phase of addressing prostitution, Vagrancy C
"made it an offence for such a common prostitute to be in a public place even if
absolutely immobile and silent unless she could give a good account of herself,
[whereas the "soliciting law"] requires the person to solicit." He concluded that this
shows how "Parliament wished to require some acts on the part of the person which
could contribute to public inconvenience.""5 As such, discursively, prostitutes and
night walkers"17 were no longer subject to the law based solely on their status, nor
did they have to "give a good account"'1 7 of themselves that was subject to the ca-
price of a police officer. In that sense, these reforms went some distance in enhanc-
ing justice and due process. As well, whereas the old legislation "applied only to
common prostitutes and night walkers," the "soliciting law" applied to "'every per-
son."'178 The expansion of the law to include male prostitutes (or "hustlers") is sig-
nificant in that the problem was no longer about prostitutes-a term that is in-
intended to refer to women-but about prostitution in general.
174. In particular, the hypocrisy of the law has been pointed to repeatedly by commentators. See
Lowman, "Prostitution in Canada" supra note 164 at 354. He refers to this as "a policy of
backdoor criminalization." See also Shaver, ibid. at 494 (speaking of "the double standard of
sexual morality").
175. Hutt, supra note 162 at 20 [emphasis added].
176. The terms "common prostitute" and "night walker" were first explicitly defined in common
law in 1949 and their definitions are illustrative of pejorative connotations associated with
this group of people. See Thomas, supra note 71 at 131 (where "'common' means available to
all sundry (with certain limitations) or at least more than one, in the conduct of her 'old
profession"'). Furthermore, a common prostitute need not be wandering in public-a
characteristic that only applies to the night walker or street walker, "who is a person who
solicits, and I cannot conceive of a night-walker who is not a common prostitute" (at 132).
Both terms are anachronistic and in disuse in the law. The term prostitute still applies, but is
expanded to include "a person of either sex who engages in prostitution." See Criminal Code
1985, supra note 15, c. C-46, s. 197(1).
177. Criminal Code 1953-1954, supra note 54 , s. 164(1)(c).
178. Hutt, supra note 162 at 20.
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This is much more than a semantic distinction. The "soliciting law" con-
structed prostitution as a problem of "public inconvenience" or "social nuisance,"
rather than a-moral concern. In that sense, it was not the prostitute that was of con-
cern, nor was it she who required regulation; it was the activities surrounding prosti-
tution. The comments of MP Grace MacInnis highlight these very concerns: "[the]
investigations of the commission showed real sex discrimination in the vagrancy
section ... many of the so-called prostitutes were not arrested for prostitution at all,
but for vagrancy. Men were never picked up for vagrancy, and consequently there
was discrimination in the code.""' According to her, the fact that this inconsistency
was addressed "is a very welcome change,"'" and illustrates the efforts to make the
law gender neutral. It is true that the "soliciting law" did not hold liable the men
who solicited women for sex, despite being a point of consideration in the Report
and the debates."' It would take some thirteen more years for this to materialize in
the "communicating law." Yet, the decriminalization of prostitution itself was mo-
mentous, and should not be overlooked. At a minimum, it attempted to rectify
many of the problems associated with the earlier legislation-especially with regard
to its gendered character. What this meant was that on the one hand, the social and
cultural figure of the vagrant virtually ceased to exist in the criminal law. Yet, on the
other hand, the vestiges of the vagrant-in particular, the prostitute-continued to
exist through the reconstruction of prostitution as a social nuisance.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this article, I have examined two waves of reform to the vagrancy section of
the Criminal Code, showing how each wave reconceptualized vagrancy and
concomitantly reconstructed the vagrant as a social problem. In so doing, I have
traced the different processes through which these reforms took place, locating
them within the social, political, and economic climate of their time.
179. Debates, 27 April 1972, supra note 153 at 1708; See also Debates, 28 April 1972, supra note
153 at 1721.
180. Debates, 27 April 1972, ibid.
181. Report on the Status of Women, supra note 136 at 369-70. See also the comments of MP
Douglas Hogarth: "If we are going to deal with prostitution in any way, shape or form, those
who participate should be just as guilty as those who are prostitutes." See Debates, 1 May
1972, supra note 153 at 1775.
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The reforms undertaken in the mid-1950s were driven by a desire to address
the technicalities of the law, though the substantial material changes that re-
sulted drastically reshaped the nature of vagrancy. In the main provision, half of
the vagrancy offences were reclassified and relocated within different sections of
the Code. Save for one, all the remaining offences underwent facelifts that in-
volved fine-tuning their legal phraseology. While the verbosity of these offences
was dramatically reduced, in many instances, the scope of the law significantly
expanded. The overall effect of these changes was a reconceptualization of va-
grancy from an offence of status to one of behaviour. With this shift as well, the
vagrant was reconstructed in important ways. Whereas in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries idleness and laziness were viewed as evidence of disrepute,
depravity, and criminality, the 1950s gave birth to an era when unemployment
was not overly threatening to the social and moral order. Common prostitutes
and night walkers, however, continued to be viewed as such, evinced in the of-
fence of Vagrancy C, which remained a status offence, and highlights the gen-
dered nature of vagrancy even in the 1950s.
The reforms undertaken in the 1970s led to the virtual demise of va-
grancy-save for the two remaining offences in the Code-which were driven
by the concerns over the appropriate uses of the criminal law. Discursively,
the social and cultural figure of the vagrant ceased to exist in law, certainly as
it stood in the preceding centuries, and even as it existed in the 1950s. The
vagrant was no longer the habitual criminal who required the strong arm of
the criminal law. If anything, he or she was a local problem, and not a threat
to national interests. Ostensibly, this was also true of the common prostitute
and night walker, who now ceased to exist in law both as a vagrant and a
moral problem. In fact, perhaps for the first time, vagrancy law was gender
neutral, given that the reforms sought to enhance equality and justice. Yet,
the very fact that prostitution was recast as .a social nuisance, still requiring
the strong arm of the criminal law, preserved the vestiges of the vagrant as she
existed in the criminal law.
